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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DARREN J. POLLICK, by and
through his Guardian ad Litem,
John R. Pollick, and JOHN R.
POLLICK.
Plaint i ff's-ll cspond en ts,

Case No.
11880

vs .
.J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and
Brief in Support Thereof

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COMES NOW plaintiffs and respondents herein
and respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a
rehearing in the above-entitled case and, for an order
vacating this Honorable Court's decision and reinstating the judgment of the trial court based on the jury's
Yerdict.
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POINT I
This Court has assumed the jury's prerogative of
weighing evidence an<l resolving issues of fact.

POINT II
This Court has deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional and statutory right of a trial by jury.
RA\YLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
Richard C. Dibblee
Robert D. Moore
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents

INTRODUCTION
The defendant, in its brief of appellant, presented
issues which it requested this Court to review. Plaintiffs
met said issues in the traditional manner, confident that
the case would be determined one way or another, on
the basis of the issues presently in the briefs. The majority opinion, however, is based on a purely collateral
issue.

It is a position of plaintiffs that if the case is to be
based on a collateral issue not raised in the briefs, at the
least, a rehearing should be granted in order that plaintiffs may be afforded a full opportunity to meet all of
the issues, including the new ones upon which the majority of this Court has based its opinion.
2

POINT I.
THIS COURT HAS ASSUMED THE JEHY'S
PHEHOGATIVE OF \VEIGHING EVIDENCE
_\:\ D HESOLYING ISSUES OF FACT.
The plaintiff, Darren J. Pollick, age 3, accompanied his father to defendant's store in Murray for the
purpose of making a purchase. \Vhile the boy was in the
store, he was injured when he stepped up on the mopboard of a bannister approximately 38 inches and
toppled over same falling to the basement below. The
mopboard was
inches in heighth and surrounded the
base of the bannister.
Plaintiffs instituted this action to recover damages
for the injuries sustained by the boy on the theory that
defendant, as a storeowner, had the legal duty to maintain the store in a reasonably safe condition for business
imitees. That the defendant breached this duty because
the bannister and mopboard combination was not reasonably safe in view of expected occupancy of the store
by children of tender years and exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm.
The testimony clearly revealed that defendant solicited parents to bring their children with them to the
store and knew that said children would be near the
bannister oYer which plaintiff fell. The testimony also
established that the mopboard could haYe been easily
and inexpensively removed or that the top railing of the
bannister could haYe been raised and thus ham mini3

mized the likelihood of children falling over the bannister. It thus appeared obvious to both the trial court
and the trial jury that just a little bit of precaution and
foresight on the part of the defendant, who clearly owed
a duty to exercise such precaution would probably ha\·e
preYented the child's injury. The manager admitted as
much in his testimony on cross-examination.
Defendant urged that because the bannister was
constructed in substantial compliance with the building
code it could not be considered unsafe. But it has never
been the law that unnamed administrative employees, by
scrivening codes of this sort, can deny to citizens substantial common law rights which spring up from fundamental duty of a corporate entity inviting the public to
attend its place of business, with profit as its motive, to
make said place reasonably safe for anticipated use.
The Honorable Court has ruled as a matter of law
that reasonable minds could not differ on the question
of defendant's negligence even though both the trial
judge and the eight-man jury felt otherwise. \Ve respectfully submit that this decision is in direct opposition
to this Court's prior decision in the case of Brent
Wheeler etc. vs. Dennis D. Jones, et al, 19 Utah 2d 392,
.J.31 P.:M 985 (1967). In the Wheeler case a 12-year old
child was an invitee to a swimming pool operated by defendants. Upon leaving the pool area, the minor walked
into a glass panel door and sustained injuries. Plaintiff
claimed defendants were negligent for failing to warn
of the presence of the door and failing to have safety
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b'lass iu the door. The jury found defendants uegligent
for maintaining a door with glass insufficient to with,laiHl unlinary bumping and awarded plaintiff damages.
The defendants appealed and this Court affirmed the
jury verdict stating:
"Negligence is the breach of a duty to use due
care under the circumstances of the situation.
"rhen children are involved, the dutv to look out
for their safety is increased, and faiiure to make
a given discovery might be negligence when children are involved and not negligence if adults
only are affected. It is a relative thing and generally must be left to the jury to say if under all
the cricumstances the conduct of the actor measures up to the standards of a reasonably prudent

man.***

All the world must know the tendency of childrrn to play rough and not to have the judgment
and maturity of adults."
ln analyzing the evidence to determine if a jury
l}Uestion was presented, the Court explained:
"The serious cuts sustained by the plaintiff are
mute evidence of the dangers inherent in the type
of door used, and we think it was a jury question
as to whether the dangers should have been recognized and corrected. The claim of error in allowing the expert witness to express an opinion
the glass door was dangerous could not be pr.eJUdicial when the jury saw the result of a colhs10n
between the minor plaintiff and that very door.
There could be no question but that the door was
dan•»erous
and a menace
to those children who
b
• ,,
were playing near 1t.
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This Honorable Court then concluded the opinion
by stating:
"\Ve believe that the defendants had their dav in
court, and an impartial jury has said that their
conduct in leaving a dangerous type of glass in a
partly closed door was an act which did not measure up to the standards of due care under the circumstances in the case."
The majority opinion states: "But except for the
fact that this accident occurred, there is no evidence that
those or any other aspects of the bannister or the mopboard were in any way at variance with the ordinary
construction of such a protective guardrail or bannister;"
It is true that there is no evidence as to "ordinary construction" of similar guardrails. But, as was said by
Justice Holmes in
and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905,
"\Vhat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to
be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard
of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied
with or not." Certainly, the factual question of what is
or is not "ordinary construction" should not be decisive
on the issue of whether ordinary minds may differ as to
whether or not the low bannister and mopboard constructed in an area frequented by small children constituted ordinary care, especially when it would have
taken such a little amount of effort to eliminate the
danger.
"\Ve respectfully submit that this Honorable Court
should grant a rehearing in order that the Wheeler case,
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and the case at bar may be reanalyzed. It appears
that one or the other of said cases should be the law of
Ctah, but
both. The two cases are diametrically opvlsed te one another on both theory and principle. Of
it is our belief that 1Vheeler should prevail.

POINT II.
THIS COURT HAS DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT OF A TRIAL BY JURY.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Honorable
Court by overturning the jury verdict has taken over the
function of the jury and denied plaintiffs their right to
a jury trial. The right of plaintiffs to have a jury decide
their case should have flowed in a natural easy way from
the likelihood of harm to children from this little, lowbuilt bannister .
.An outstanding and often cited case that prescribes
guide lines in determining whether given fact situations
raise jury questions is Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33
Ctah 222, 93 P.2d 570 (1908), where the Court stated:
"''re have no hesitancy in saying that, if the facts
were for us to pass upon, we should be forced to
arrive at a conclusion different from that reached
by the jury; for it would be quite difficult for us
to see how the officers of the city as reasonably
prudent men, should have foreseen that boys
would go down a dark passage way of over six
hundred feet in length, nearly four hundred feet
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of which was totally dark, and play therein, and
that although they did so, they would go or fall
into the water coming into the conduit from the
Jordan Canal. And if childish instincts induced
them to resort to the conduit to play "jail" or
otherwise, one would naturally assume that they
would instinctively avoid going into the dark
passage way to the length of nearly two ordinary
city blocks. In the statement herein made that,
were we permitted to pass on the facts and determine the question, not as matter of law but of
fact, we would arrive at a conclusion different
from that found by the jury, the Chief Justice
authorizes us to say that he is not prepared to
say that, if he were a trier of the fact, he would
find in favor of the defendant on the question of
negligence (upon this question he expresses no
opinion); but that he is, however, clearly of the
opinion that the facts amply justified the court in
submitting the question of negligence to the
jury."
The leading modern Utah case on the right of trial
by jury is Stickle v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 122 Utah
477, 251 P.2d 867, where this Court stated:
"In our democratic system, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived;
from its initiation and creation to its final application and enforcement, the law is the expression
of their will. The functioning of a cross-section
of the citizenry as a jury is the method by which
in. the apylic.ation of
the people express this
law to controversies which arise under 1t. Both
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure
trial by jury to citizens of this state.
Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by
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presuming to determine questions of fact which
litigants have a right to have passed upon by
juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is its
safeguarding against such arbitrary power in the
courts. To the great credit of the courts of t}1's
country, they have been extremely reluctant to
infringe upon this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the administration of justice
close to the people. Of course, the rights of litigants should not be surrendered to the arbitrary
will of juries without regard to whether there is
a violation of legal rights as a basis for recovery.
The court does have a duty and a responsibility of
supervisory control over the action of juries which
is just as essential to the proper administration of
justice as the function of the jury itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the vital importance of the privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice and deem it our duty to zealously
protect and preserve it.
CONCLUSION

It is our position that this Honorable Court's majority decision has for the first time, brought clearly into
focus the question of whether the Plaintiffs have been
deprived of their right to a jury trial. This question is of
overriding importance, not only to the Plaintiffs but to
the bench and bar generally. 'Ve would like to have it
reviewed.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard C. Dibblee
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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